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A Cooperative Federalism Approach to Shareholder 
Arbitration 
Zachary D. Clopton & Verity Winship 
abstract.  Arbitration dominates private law across an ever-expanding range of ﬁelds. Its 
latest target, however, may not be a new ﬁeld as much as a new form: mandatory arbitration pro-
visions built into corporate charters and bylaws. Recent developments in corporate law coupled 
with signals from the Securities and Exchange Commission suggest that regulators may be newly 
receptive to shareholder arbitration. What they do next may have dramatic consequences for 
whether and how corporate and securities laws are enforced. 
 The debate about the merits of arbitration is well worn, but its application to shareholder 
claims opens the door to a diﬀerent set of responses. In particular, the overlapping authority of 
federal and state actors with respect to corporate law calls for approaches that sound in cooperative 
federalism. Yet cooperative-federalist approaches have been absent from recent debates about 
shareholder arbitration. This Essay explains why cooperative federalism is a natural ﬁt for address-
ing these issues. Moreover, we marshal speciﬁc examples of cooperative solutions in this area that 
could help frame federal-state coordination going forward. Such a cooperative response would 
avoid unnecessary federal-state conﬂict and allow policymakers to approach shareholder arbitra-
tion with expertise, accountability, and mutual respect. 
introduction  
We live in the era of the “mass production” of arbitration clauses.1 Corpora-
tions now routinely insert mandatory arbitration clauses into consumer con-
tracts, employment agreements, and other legal documents. During the last few 
 
1. Judith Resnik, Diﬀusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, 
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2812 (2015). Professor Resnik refers to mass-
produced arbitration “clauses,” rather than mass-produced arbitration, because potential 
claimants rarely follow through on arbitration. Id. 
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decades, the Supreme Court’s aggressive interpretation of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA)2 has accelerated the rise of arbitration: arbitrators are deciding 
more issues; more federal statutory rights are being subjected to mandatory ar-
bitration; and the FAA is preempting more state laws that might stem this rising 
tide.3 
Shareholder litigation may be the next target for this mass production.4 Alt-
hough arbitration has been available for securities claims by investors against 
their brokers for decades,5 developments in a related area of law have opened up 
new possibilities for mass-produced arbitration clauses. In recent years, corpo-
rations and policymakers have begun to pay considerable attention to a new 
frontier: the inclusion of dispute-resolution provisions in corporate charters and 
bylaws, including provisions requiring shareholders to arbitrate claims against 
the corporation and its oﬃcers and directors.  
Unlike in consumer or employment contracts, there is not even a ﬁction that 
shareholders negotiate the terms of corporate governance documents before they 
buy shares on the New York Stock Exchange.6 Yet if a corporation had the fore-
sight to include arbitration provisions in its governing documents, some have 
suggested that its shareholders may be subject to mandatory arbitration—in-
cluding for nonwaivable claims under federal securities laws.7 
The consequences of a shi� to shareholder arbitration could be substantial. 
Private litigation, especially private aggregate litigation, is one of the main tools 
for enforcing securities and corporate law in the United States. A shi� to arbi-
 
2. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208; 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 
(2012). 
3. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 
3052, 3059-74 (2015) (discussing, inter alia, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International, 559 
U.S. 662 (2010), AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)); Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Re-
trenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 411, 419-20 (2018) (same). 
4. See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., SEC Commissioner Jackson Talks Mandatory Arbitration, CLS 
BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 28, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/02/28/sec 
-commissioner-jackson-talks-mandatory-arbitration [https://perma.cc/JE9S-W92R] (cur-
rent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner noting that “recent changes 
in the landscape have made [him] more, not less, concerned about [shareholder arbitra-
tion]”). 
5. See infra Section I.C. 
6. See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Char-
ters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 587 (2016) (“Corporations, by contrast, are organized 
around principles more akin to trust law [than to contract law], whereby inexpert and o�en 
dispersed shareholders are presumed to be incapable of bargaining on their own behalf . . . .”). 
7. See id. at 585 (collecting cases and sources); Clopton, supra note 3, at 419-20 (same). 
a cooperative federalism approach to shareholder arbitration 
171 
tration likely would dramatically reduce the number of claims ﬁled, in part be-
cause representative actions such as class actions or derivative suits probably 
would be unavailable.8 The future of shareholder rights may be at stake. 
This possibility is more than idle speculation. Already, some foreign entities 
have included arbitration language in their governance documents. And in the 
summer of 2017, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner 
Michael Piwowar signaled that the SEC might be willing to consider approving 
U.S. corporate charters that included mandatory arbitration provisions. In a talk 
at the Heritage Foundation, Piwowar issued this invitation: “For shareholder 
lawsuits, companies can come to [the SEC] to ask for relief to put in mandatory 
arbitration into their charters . . . . I would encourage companies to come and 
talk to us about that.”9 Commissioner Piwowar’s announcement, as well as pe-
riodic reports from within the agency,10 have signaled a potential departure from 
the SEC’s traditional rejection of mandatory arbitration in this context. 
Mandatory arbitration of shareholder claims is not a new proposal. It has 
roots in policy proposals and academic debate raised periodically since the 
1980s.11 U.S. corporations have sporadically—and so far unsuccessfully—exper-
 
8. See David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 206-
07 (2015); see also Resnik, supra note 1, at 2872-73 (ﬁnding that almost all credit card arbitra-
tion agreements expressly disallowed class arbitration). 
9. Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC’s Piwowar Urges Companies to Pursue Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 
REUTERS (July 17, 2017, 3:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-arbitration
/u-s-secs-piwowar-urges-companies-to-pursue-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-idUSKBN1
A221Y [https://perma.cc/5H6G-ZPXB]. Commissioner Piwowar has announced that he will 
step down in July 2018, following the end of his oﬃcial term. See Katanga Johnson, SEC Com-
missioner Piwowar, a Republican, to Step Down, REUTERS (May 7, 2018, 3:27 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-piwowar/sec-commissioner-piwowar-a-republican-to 
-step-down-idUSKBN1I828F [https://perma.cc/K8SF-UM49]. 
10. Benjamin Bain, SEC Weighs a Big Gi� to Companies: Blocking Investor Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 26, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-26/trump-s 
-sec-mulls-big-gi�-to-companies-blocking-investor-suits [https://perma.cc/3UG3-3593]. 
11. See, e.g., John C. Coﬀee, Jr., No Exit? Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and 
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 953-57 (1988); Michael R. Bloomberg & 
Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, 
NYC 21, 102-03 (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_ﬁnal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L8NS-C8HD] (explicitly recommending that the SEC reverse its opposi-
tion to shareholder arbitration); Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 
COMMITTEE ON CAP. MKTS. REG. 72, 110 (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-Interim-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K3L8-JEL3] (proposing mandatory arbitration of shareholder claims); see also Bar-
bara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 802, 820-23 (providing background on proposals to increase the use of mandatory share-
holder arbitration agreements). 
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imented with such provisions, presumably with the goal of avoiding costly (of-
ten class-action) litigation.12 In past decades, rumors circulated that the SEC was 
considering approving mandatory arbitration in corporate organizational docu-
ments.13 In addition to renewed signals from the SEC, one important aspect of 
the legal landscape has changed since these earlier debates: state courts have be-
gun to approve corporate governance documents that restrict shareholder litiga-
tion to particular courts. This shi� has emboldened proponents of shareholder 
arbitration who view these approvals as a signal that channeling shareholder 
claims to arbitration may now be permissible.14 
These developments not only suggest that shareholder arbitration may be a 
pressing concern to corporate actors and those entities that regulate them, but 
these developments also are a reminder that corporate law is shared space. Cor-
porate governance rules under state law coexist—sometimes uncomfortably—
with federal securities laws. Incursions and overlap are not uncommon, but 
much of the time state and federal actors govern their own, separate spheres.15 
This Essay, however, argues that “staying in your lane” is not an option for state 
or federal regulators when it comes to the mandatory arbitration of shareholder 
claims. Even a provision narrowly dra�ed to cover only federal claims cannot 
avoid, for example, the question whether the state of incorporation permits man-
datory arbitration at all in the corporate context. These battles may be waged in 
the SEC as well as in state and federal courts—and the outcomes of these battles 
will determine the landscape of corporate litigation for years to come. 
This Essay does not focus on the normative arguments for and against man-
datory arbitration. Instead, we start from the assumption that shareholder arbi-
tration is a live policy question, and one which—given the stakes—demands 
careful analysis. The issue we address is not whether companies should adopt 
mandatory arbitration provisions or whether the SEC should approve these pro-
visions as a matter of policy. We ask whether and when companies can adopt 
these provisions without running afoul of state or federal law, and what process 
state and federal actors can employ to resolve the important policy questions 
 
12. See infra Part I. 
13. See Black, supra note 11, at 821. 
14. This development revived hope for mandatory arbitration provisions in corporate governance 
documents because exclusive-forum clauses are close cousins to mandatory arbitration clauses 
in that both ultimately determine where disputes will be resolved—whether in a speciﬁc court 
or an arbitral forum. 
15. Cf. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reﬂections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 
667 (1974) (noting that corporate disclosure regulation has become largely the exclusive prov-
ince of the federal government, while many other aspects of corporate governance remain 
within the ambit of state law). 
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raised by shareholder arbitration. In Part I, we identify the constraints on man-
datory shareholder arbitration clauses imposed by state and federal law. And in 
Part II, we suggest how agencies might navigate these overlapping spheres 
through state and federal cooperation and consultation at an early stage of poli-
cymaking. 
Our overall message is that—like countless issues before—questions about 
how to regulate arbitration provisions in corporate governance documents are 
amenable to solutions that sound in cooperative federalism. Cooperative feder-
alism has been absent from recent debates about shareholder arbitration, yet we 
believe the concept is a natural ﬁt for addressing these issues, which arise at the 
intersection of federal and state authority. Moreover, we marshal speciﬁc exam-
ples of cooperative solutions in this area that can help frame federal-state coor-
dination going forward. Such a cooperative response would avoid unnecessary 
federal-state conﬂict, and it would allow policymakers to approach these issues 
with expertise, accountability, and mutual respect. 
i .  the legal framework  
Corporate regulatory space is shared, both in terms of the governing law and 
in terms of the legal actors with regulatory authority. We begin by examining 
the reach of shareholder arbitration clauses, then draw on these underpinnings 
to address federal and state authority over shareholder arbitration. In short, ar-
bitration provisions addressing shareholder litigation will ultimately run up 
against important questions of public policy at both the federal and state levels. 
A. Scope of Mandatory Shareholder Arbitration Clauses 
The starting point for our analysis of mandatory arbitration provisions is a 
closer look at the provisions at issue. The scope of these provisions varies, 
prompting two questions: Whose claims do they cover? And what types of 
claims are covered? 
For ordinary contracts, the answer to the question of whose claims are cov-
ered is obvious: arbitration clauses cover the claims of the parties to the contract. 
But corporate organizational documents are diﬀerent. Corporate charters and 
bylaws purport to deﬁne the relationships among directors, oﬃcers, sharehold-
ers, and the company itself. More speciﬁcally, the mandatory arbitration clauses 
that have attracted recent attention are aimed at claims by only one set of corpo-
rate actors: shareholders. Commissioner Piwowar’s comments invited these 
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provisions for shareholder lawsuits speciﬁcally, and advocates of mandatory arbi-
tration in corporate charters and bylaws have pointed to pathologies of share-
holder litigation for justiﬁcation.16 
But the term “shareholder litigation” identiﬁes the plaintiﬀs without speci-
fying the type of claim, which is the subject of our second question. An arbitra-
tion clause might broadly track the whole category of shareholder litigation, cov-
ering all claims by shareholders regardless of the legal source. Examples of this 
all-purpose approach can be found in the organizational documents of some 
non-U.S. corporations that trade on U.S. stock exchanges. Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC, for example, requires arbitration of all disputes between shareholders and 
the company, including “all disputes arising under UK, Dutch or US law (in-
cluding securities laws), or under any other law.”17 An arbitration provision un-
successfully proposed for Pﬁzer in 2012 was similarly broad, reaching “any con-
troversy or claim by shareholders.”18 
But mandatory arbitration is not necessarily an all-or-nothing game. Man-
datory arbitration clauses may designate particular claims for arbitration, leaving 
other issues for courts.19 In the context of intracorporate disputes and share-
holder litigation under U.S. law, the key distinction is between claims governed 
by state corporate law (o�en claims within the “internal aﬀairs doctrine”20) and 
those governed by federal law (o�en claims under federal securities laws21). 
 
16. See, e.g., Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 751, 757-60 (2015); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The SEC Should Authorize Mandatory 
Arbitration of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 30, 2018), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/01/the-sec-should-au-
thorize-mandatory-arbitration-of-shareholder-class-action-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc
/Q787-D83S] (citing Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth 
Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to 
Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 610-11 (2010)). 
17. Annual Report, ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC 77 (2017), https://reports.shell.com/annual-re-
port/2017/servicepages/downloads/ﬁles/shell_annual_report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc
/KSP2-GRX7] (reprinting the company’s Articles of Association); see id. at 16 (“Our Articles 
of Association generally require that all disputes between our shareholders . . . and the Com-
pany . . . be exclusively resolved by arbitration . . . .”). 
18. Pﬁzer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597, at *13 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
19. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs 
From Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1950 (2014). 
20. The “internal aﬀairs doctrine” provides that the law of the incorporating state generally gov-
erns the “internal aﬀairs” of a corporation. What counts as an internal aﬀair has been devel-
oped in case law, and roughly encompasses the rights and duties of internal corporate actors 
to each other. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
21. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
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An arbitration clause might explicitly limit its reach to one type of claim. 
Consider the example of exclusive-forum-selection bylaws, which, like arbitra-
tion clauses, purport to deﬁne the permissible sites for resolution of shareholder 
claims. A common model bylaw selects Delaware as the forum for shareholders’ 
claims that arise under state corporate law, while remaining silent as to other 
claims.22 Alternatively, an arbitration clause might channel federal and state law 
claims to diﬀerent forums. Blue Apron (a company that provides food-delivery 
services), for example, included a charter provision that designates Delaware as 
the forum for state corporate law claims and federal courts as the exclusive forum 
for certain securities claims.23 
Whether these clauses cover federal, state, or all claims has consequences for 
the relative importance of federal and state regulation. Nevertheless, regardless 
of their scope, all such clauses fall somewhere within a shared federal-state reg-
ulatory space. 
B. State Law 
The organizational documents of corporations are a core province of state 
corporate law. State corporate codes typically govern the nature, form, and con-
tent of corporate organizational documents. Sections of state corporate codes 
dictate the contents of the corporate charter and bylaws, for instance.24 For both 
types of organizational documents, state corporate codes describe a general cat-
egory of provisions that might be included, as well as expressly permitting some 
provisions and expressly prohibiting others.25 
Delaware state law currently limits the ability of Delaware corporations to 
adopt mandatory arbitration charter provisions or bylaws.26 In 2013, the Dela-
ware Chancery Court held that forum selection bylaws were facially valid, and a 
 
22. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An 
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 352, 380-81 (2012). 
23. See Blue Apron Holdings, Inc., Restated Certiﬁcate of Incorporation, art. XIII (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://investors.blueapron.com/~/media/Files/B/BlueApron-IR/documents/governance 
-documents/certiﬁcate-of-incorporation.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT2S-4924] (designating 
the Delaware Chancery Court for derivative suits and internal aﬀairs claims and federal dis-
trict courts for shareholder claims under the Securities Act of 1933). 
24. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(a), 109(b) (2018); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 2.02, 
2.06 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing a model set of requirements for corporations’ articles 
of incorporation and model recommendations for bylaws). 
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2018) (permitting a general category of provi-
sions for certiﬁcates of incorporation); id. § 115 (permitting expressly certain forum selection 
clauses for “internal corporate claims”). 
26. See id. § 115. 
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year later the Delaware Supreme Court approved fee-shi�ing clauses.27 These 
decisions triggered further litigation, debate, and ultimately state-level legisla-
tion that amended the permissible contents of Delaware corporations’ charters 
and bylaws.28 The Delaware Code now prohibits fee shi�ing, but it permits ex-
clusive-forum charter provisions and bylaws as long as they do not exclude Del-
aware courts.29 Because mandatory arbitration provisions would exclude Dela-
ware courts, Delaware corporations currently cannot include sweeping 
arbitration provisions in their governance documents.30 
The structure of the Delaware legislation highlights the underlying federal-
ism issues. The legislation banned mandatory arbitration clauses only for one 
type of business organization (the corporation) incorporated in one state (Dela-
ware). And the Delaware legislation reaches only mandatory arbitration of “in-
ternal corporate claims,” roughly state law corporate governance claims. In other 
words, the state legislation was silent as to whether it reaches non-state-law dis-
putes, triggering debate over what that silence means for the arbitration of share-
holders’ federal claims. 
C. Federal Law 
Although corporate law is traditionally a matter of state concern, mandatory 
arbitration provisions governing shareholder litigation would implicate two im-
portant areas of federal law. First, these provisions exist against the backdrop of 
federal law governing arbitration, speciﬁcally the FAA. Second, because these 
provisions govern shareholder claims, they also concern federal securities laws. 
 
27. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (approving a fee-shi�-
ing bylaw in a Delaware nonstock corporation); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron 
Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch. 2013) (approving exclusive-forum bylaws). 
28. See generally Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016) 
(outlining these developments and providing a framework for analyzing them). 
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b), 115 (2018). Charters and bylaws may require “that 
any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the 
courts in this State” but may not “prohibit bringing such claims in the courts of this State.” 
Id. § 115. 
30. See S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., synopsis § 5 (Del. 2015) (enacted) (describing the statute as 
“invalidat[ing] such a provision selecting the courts in a diﬀerent State, or an arbitral forum, 
if it would preclude litigating such claims in the Delaware courts”) (emphasis added); see also 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-113(b)(2)(ii) (West 2018) (“The charter or bylaws of a 
corporation may not prohibit bringing an internal corporate claim in the courts of this State 
or a federal court sitting in this State.”). 
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Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are presumptively valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable. This presumption is triggered, however, only if corporate gov-
erning documents count as “contracts” under the FAA.31 Whether a corpora-
tion’s governing documents are contracts under the FAA is not settled. Good 
public-policy reasons exist for rejecting this characterization.32 And as a practical 
matter, corporate governance documents lack a central feature of contracts: the 
bargain.33 State law might ﬁll the gap in FAA jurisprudence by answering 
whether charters and bylaws count as “contracts.”34 But even in state law, where 
judicial rhetoric o�en depicts these documents as contractual, corporate govern-
ance documents do not carry all of the consequences of contract.35 
One might think that this FAA question is moot because of provisions in the 
securities statutes that bar waivers of compliance with the securities laws.36 
These provisions could be understood to prohibit waivers of access to courts, 
and thus shareholder-arbitration provisions that covered securities claims would 
be unenforceable under the statute. However, the Supreme Court has upheld 
mandatory arbitration of certain securities claims against brokers despite the 
nonwaiver provision.37 The Court le� open a narrow basis for invalidating such 
a clause: it might collide with the nonwaiver provision if arbitration were “inad-
equate to protect . . . substantive rights.”38 This standard is diﬃcult to meet, 
 
31. The FAA’s key substantive provision refers to arbitration provisions in a “contract.” See 9 
U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
32. Professor Ann Lipton has ably demonstrated that internal corporate documents lack many of 
the deﬁning features of contracts in FAA jurisprudence and that treating them as contracts 
could have deleterious consequences across a range of issues—but she also concedes that the 
Supreme Court might disagree either because of its “substantive vision of arbitration’s vir-
tues” or because of its “robust view of shareholder consent.” See Lipton, supra note 6, at 592, 
640. 
33. Indeed, the cases enforcing mandatory arbitration of securities claims that we describe below 
may be distinguishable because the arbitration clauses were in signed customer agreements. 
34. Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 107, 113 (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 
514 U.S. 938, 994 (1995)). 
35. See generally Verity Winship, Litigation Rights and the Corporate Contract, in THE CORPORATE 
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (William Savitt et al. eds., forthcoming) (discussing state law 
determining whether corporate organizational documents count as contracts). 
36. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012). 
37. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229, 238 (1987); see also Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974). 
38. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229. 
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particularly given the Supreme Court’s aggressive interpretation of the FAA in 
recent years.39 
Federal inputs also come from the SEC, especially for public companies. The 
SEC polices mandatory arbitration clauses in several regulatory contexts, includ-
ing through its review of companies’ registration statements and its screening of 
shareholder proposals.40 Although it has not issued more general policy guid-
ance, the agency has long indicated its opposition to the inclusion of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in corporate charters and bylaws. It has refused, for example, 
to accelerate registration statements with charters that contain such a clause.41 
In the context of shareholder proposals, SEC staﬀ have suggested that manda-
tory arbitration charter provisions might violate securities laws.42 Indeed, the 
SEC’s anti-arbitration stance may be a key reason we have not seen a prolifera-
tion of shareholder arbitration provisions to date. 
However, it seems that the SEC’s position against mandatory arbitration of 
shareholder claims may be wavering.43 A change in SEC policy on this topic 
could cause a surge in new shareholder arbitration provisions. 
In sum, federal law is not entirely clear on the validity of arbitration provi-
sions in corporate organizational documents. The SEC has staked out a position, 
but there are reasons to believe that this position might change. And the federal 
courts in recent decades have signaled an interest in ever-broader readings of the 
FAA. These pro-arbitration trends run counter to recent developments in state 
law, as Delaware has sought to limit the ability of corporations to use mandatory 
arbitration to restrict shareholder litigation. 
 
39. See generally Resnik, supra note 1 (evaluating the implications of the Supreme Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence). 
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017). 
41. See, e.g., Miles Weiss et al., Carlyle Drops Class-Action Lawsuit Ban as Opposition Mounts, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2012, 5:57 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012 
-02-03/carlyle-drops-class-action-lawsuit-ban [https://perma.cc/5SZE-BNYH] (“Carlyle 
Group LP abandoned a plan to ban shareholders from ﬁling class-action lawsuits a�er U.S. 
regulators threatened to block a stock sale the private-equity ﬁrm is seeking to complete as 
soon as April.”). 
42. Gannett Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124, at *1 (Feb. 22, 2012) (allowing the 
company to exclude a proposal for mandatory arbitration because “there appear[ed] to be 
some basis for [the] view that implementation of the [mandatory arbitration] proposal would 
cause the company to violate the federal securities laws”); Pﬁzer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2012 WL 587597, at *1 (Feb. 22, 2012) (similar); see also Carl W. Schneider, Arbitration in Cor-
porate Governance Documents: An Idea the SEC Refuses to Accelerate, 4 INSIGHTS 5, 24 (1990) 
(reporting that SEC staﬀ considered shareholder arbitration provisions to “seriously impair[] 
the deterrent function of private rights of action” and “violate[] the anti-waiver provision of 
the federal securities laws”); supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
43. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
a cooperative federalism approach to shareholder arbitration 
179 
ii .  cooperative federalism  
The previous Part demonstrated that federal and state actors have overlap-
ping claims of authority for the regulation of shareholder arbitration. What 
should we make of these overlapping claims? This perennial question lends itself 
to a few commonly suggested but unsatisfying options. First, it is possible that 
federal regulators and each of the ﬁ�y states will independently settle on the 
same regulatory strategy. We have our doubts. Second, it is also possible that 
federal and state regulators will stay in their lanes.44 We ﬁnd this unlikely as 
well,45 and for reasons explained below, we think we can do better as a matter of 
policy. 
A third option is conﬂict. Corporations could adopt (SEC-encouraged) ar-
bitration provisions in seeming conﬂict with state corporate codes, claiming that 
the FAA preempts those state limits. Or the SEC could issue some form of ad-
ministrative determination that purportedly negates any conﬂicting state law;46 
for example, disregarding or preempting any state law that limits the arbitration 
of securities claims against corporations incorporated in that state.47 
Resolving either of these conﬂicts would require facing fraught questions of 
statutory and perhaps constitutional law. A conﬂict implicating the FAA would 
likely require the Supreme Court to determine whether bylaws and charters 
qualify as “contracts” under the statute.48 An administrative-preemption instru-
ment could expressly authorize arbitration of shareholder claims, but it would 
pose countless new challenges.49 Moreover, not only are these questions thorny, 
 
44. It is at least theoretically possible that state and federal regulators could identify mutually 
exclusive spheres of regulation. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1485, 1491 (1994) (“There was, in fact, a time when the Supreme Court ﬂirted with the 
idea of establishing absolute, mutually exclusive domains for the state and federal govern-
ments.”). 
45. See, e.g., id. at 1499 (“[I]t’s no longer possible to maintain a ﬁxed domain of exclusive state 
jurisdiction . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
46. See Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,729, 4,731 (Feb. 5, 1996) (requiring that new fed-
eral regulations “specif[y] in clear language the preemptive eﬀect, if any, to be given to the 
law”); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2156 n.122 (2009) (noting that EO 12,988 applies to independent agencies 
such as the SEC). 
47. A conﬂict also would arise if the SEC (or Congress) were to enact a broad rule (or statute) 
expressly preempting any state corporate-law provisions that limit shareholder arbitration 
clauses. This strikes us as much less likely than the options we propose in text, however. 
48. Given the stakes of this issue and the Supreme Court’s interest in arbitration, see supra note 
39 and accompanying text, we suspect that the Supreme Court may be interested in address-
ing this question sooner rather than later. 
49. For example: what is the scope of “administrative preemption”? Would this hypothetical ad-
ministrative determination be within the scope of the SEC’s authority? What deference, if 
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but compelling the courts—and ultimately the Supreme Court—to answer them 
also has costs of its own. For one thing, waiting for the Supreme Court to resolve 
these issues will create unnecessary uncertainty, perhaps for a prolonged pe-
riod.50 For another, as a matter of institutional design, we suspect that the Su-
preme Court is not well-positioned to resolve these issues. Policy decisions in 
this area would beneﬁt from the expertise of both federal securities regulators 
and state actors familiar with internal corporate governance issues. 
The good news is that the well-worn path of cooperative federalism51 oﬀers 
a way out of this dilemma. We think the SEC should take it. We are especially 
optimistic about this approach because it is consistent with current executive 
branch policy and with tools already in the SEC’s toolkit. 
Federal law is o�en sensitive to state-law interests and routinely incorporates 
state-law principles.52 Federal administrative law has come to embrace the im-
portance of federalism as well.53 In 1999, President Bill Clinton issued Executive 
Order 13,132, parsimoniously titled “Federalism.”54 EO 13,132 called upon exec-
utive agencies to take federalism principles seriously, and requires that “[e]ach 
agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input 
by State and local oﬃcials in the development of regulatory policies that have 
 
any, is due the SEC? Should the evaluation of agency action account specially for state inter-
ests? 
50. For example, the Supreme Court o�en prefers percolation among lower courts and circuit 
splits. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a). 
51. Cooperative federalism, as the name suggests, imagines cooperative relationships between the 
federal government and the states. This could include formal federal-state collaborations, or 
“a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government and the states that allows 
states to regulate within a framework delineated by federal law.” Philip J. Weiser, Towards a 
Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001). See gen-
erally Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Auton-
omy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (oﬀering a useful 
discussion of cooperative federalism); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-
optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983) (same). 
52. State property law is o�en an input in federal-law cases. See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 
§ 4520 (3d ed. 2018) (collecting examples). Federal common law presumptively incorporates 
state law. See e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). 
53. Indeed, the SEC itself addresses state-law issues in many of its legal determinations. See, e.g., 
Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certiﬁcation of State-Law Questions by Fed-
eral Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 203-05 (2010) (collecting cases of SEC applying state law 
and ﬁnding that nine percent of no-action letters included state law determinations); see also 
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (interpreting require-
ment in the Securities Act of 1933 that SEC consider eﬃciency as requiring consideration of 
state law). 
54. Exec. Order 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
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federalism implications.”55 Administrative law scholars have cataloged various 
agencies’ eﬀorts to comply with the order, and they have explored how many of 
the beneﬁts of federalism can translate to the administrative law context.56 
Although independent agencies such as the SEC are not required to follow 
EO 13,132—the Order merely “encourage[s]” independent agency compli-
ance57—we think it is a model for SEC consideration of state interests in share-
holder arbitration. Indeed, cooperative corporate law federalism turns criticism 
of administrative federalism on its head. Critics have worried that using state 
participation to protect state interests in administrative law is in tension with the 
goals of expertise and accountability, which may be hindered by state participa-
tion.58 Although this might be true for many areas, it does not accurately char-
acterize corporate governance. State consultation not only is consistent with the 
background norm of state supremacy in corporate law, but it also is consistent 
with the goals of expertise and accountability. Whether one agrees with their 
substantive choices, it is clear that Delaware legislators and Delaware courts have 
expertise on issues of internal corporate governance, perhaps greater expertise 
even than that of the SEC. On accountability, as explored in more detail below, 
the state consultation we propose in this Essay requires the participation of state 
political actors and may ultimately result in a state legislative response. In short, 
therefore, cooperative federalism has the potential to protect state interests and 
promote expertise and accountability in corporate law. 
Assuming that federalism has something to contribute to the shareholder ar-
bitration issue, is there any reason to believe that the SEC could eﬀectively use 
cooperative federalist tools?59 Perhaps. In 2007, Delaware took the unusual step 
of authorizing its highest court to answer certiﬁed questions from the SEC60—a 
 
55. Id. at 43,257. When possible, the EO calls for consultation “early in the process of developing 
the proposed regulation.” Id. 
56. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008) 
(addressing this topic and collecting sources); Miriam Sei�er, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 
67 VAND. L. REV 443, 461-73 (2014) [hereina�er Sei�er, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy] 
(same); Miriam Sei�er, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 
953, 970-79 (2014) [hereina�er Sei�er, States as Interest Groups] (same); Sharkey, supra note 
46 at 2155-72 (same). Metzger and Sharkey are more positive about the role of states in ad-
ministrative law than Sei�er. See supra and sources. 
57. Exec. Order 13132, supra note 54, 43,259. 
58. Sei�er, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, supra note 56, at 449-50. 
59. Because the SEC is actively considering these issues—and because Congress has not expressed 
signiﬁcant interest in the subject—we focus on the SEC as the federal component of our co-
operative federalism proposals. 
60. Act of May 3, 2007, 76 Del. Laws, ch. 37, § 1 (2007); see Winship, supra note 53, at 192-98 
(discussing certiﬁcation from non-Article III courts generally and Delaware’s “experiment” 
with the SEC speciﬁcally). 
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process usually reserved for communications between courts.61 In 2008, the SEC 
certiﬁed a question related to Delaware law.62 Less than two months later, the 
Delaware Supreme Court answered.63 This SEC-Delaware certiﬁcation process 
“exhibit[s] respect for state sovereignty[,] . . . further[s] general values of fed-
eralism and comity . . . [and] takes advantage of state courts’ expertise in state 
law . . . .”64 It also suggests the SEC is capable of engaging in cooperative feder-
alism. 
The SEC could adopt a federalist posture to shareholder arbitration through 
a number of strategies. Under one possible strategy, without any contact with 
any state oﬃcial, the SEC could simply condition its judgment regarding arbi-
tration clauses on state law. The SEC would announce a general policy that in-
tracorporate provisions regulating arbitration are valid only to the extent per-
mitted by the law of the state in which the corporation is organized. The SEC 
would then apply its conditional-approval principle in individual cases—and, in 
so doing, it could use certiﬁed questions when necessary to determine the scope 
of state law. The SEC also could take the same stance without announcing a for-
mal policy. In that case, the SEC would evaluate a particular registration state-
ment (or other action) in light of state law, perhaps signaling that this approach 
would be replicated in future cases. This harmonization would avoid the costs of 
conﬂict while also capturing the beneﬁts of federalism—just as with corporate 
regulation generally in the United States. 
Alternatively, the SEC could follow the model of EO 13,132 and directly con-
sult with state regulators and legislators who work on these issues. State oﬃcials, 
too, could aﬃrmatively reach out to the SEC to promote cooperation. A consul-
tative approach might encourage the SEC to be sensitive to state corporate law, 
and it might encourage state actors to more clearly delineate the scope of state 
law. 
Indeed, any method of federal-state interaction might encourage states (es-
pecially Delaware) to act. As we mentioned, Delaware has seemingly punted on 
the question whether Delaware corporations may adopt arbitration provisions 
 
61. See, e.g., Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (praising the use of certiﬁed 
questions to state courts). 
62. See Certiﬁcation of Questions of Law Arising from Rule 14a-8 Proposal by Shareholder of CA, Inc., 
SEC (June 27, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9VAT-ZVLA]. 
63. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 228 (Del. 2008); see also ATP Tour, 
Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014) (answering certiﬁed question from a 
federal court). 
64. Winship, supra note 53, at 211. Certiﬁcation also may provide for review in situations where 
agency action may otherwise be unreviewable. Id. at 212. 
a cooperative federalism approach to shareholder arbitration 
183 
that apply to non-Delaware claims. Of course, Delaware might decide not to reg-
ulate such provisions, but our proposal puts the ball in Delaware’s court to make 
a formal, transparent choice about this corporate law issue. In this way, this ap-
proach would have a preference-eliciting eﬀect on the states, which can have 
positive consequences for accountability and expertise, while remaining con-
sistent with the background norm of state primacy in corporate law. In addition, 
states would have the beneﬁt of federal expertise when making their choices 
about arbitration.65 
Any of these approaches would be preferable to the federal-state conﬂict we 
warned of earlier. If the SEC elected to directly incorporate state law, the poten-
tial for conﬂict would evaporate and decision-making authority would be allo-
cated to the appropriate level. If the SEC instead chose consultation, conﬂicts 
might still arise, though they would potentially be moderated if federal regula-
tors ultimately adapted their policies to better conform to state law, or if state 
legislatures and regulators adapted their policies to better match federal law.66 
Moreover, we might give a federal agency more deference in intruding on tradi-
tional areas of state regulation if it consulted in good faith with states ﬁrst. It 
would be even better if these administrative actions were judicially reviewable, 
and one beneﬁt of our certiﬁcation approach is that it would subject potentially 
unreviewable actions to a court for review. At a minimum, though, pre-consul-
tation with state actors would make administrative actions more expert, more 
accountable, and more politically palatable. 
conclusion  
Sooner or later, policymakers will have to decide whether corporate govern-
ance documents can require arbitration of shareholder claims. How state and 
federal actors should respond to this development remains an open question. 
Corporate law implicates both federal and state authority, and thus shareholder 
arbitration should be resolved with respect for the shared nature of this regula-
tory space. Cooperative federalism provides solutions that are particularly well 
suited to these institutional design challenges. We hope that federal and state 
actors will consider its lessons. 
 
 
65. In this way, the solution we advocate is not simply acquiescence to state preferences but a truly 
cooperative solution to a problem of federal and state concern. 
66. Of course, these proposals are not mutually exclusive. The SEC could make its approvals con-
ditional on state law, but also work directly with state regulators to develop better overall 
policies for the future. 
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